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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Cal. 39, 266 Pac. 518. Texas, however, has no statute of the second type,
and by a proper interpretation of its statute the principal case could not
have been decided otherwise. At least four other states are similarly
deficient in that the cohabitation with a second spouse married outside the
state is not bigamy. Kimser v. Commonwealth (1918) 181 Ky. 727, 205
S. W. 951; State v. Ray (1909) 151 N. C. 710, 66 S. E. 204; McBride v.
Graeber (1915) 16 Ga. App. 240, 85 S. E. 86; State v. Stephens (1919)
118 Me. 237, 107 Atl. 296. H. C. H., '31.
CONFLICT OF LAWs-EFFECT OF RECORD OF CHATTEL MORTGAGE.-A I im-
portant question in the law of chattel mortgages relates to the effect the
recording in one state has when the mortgaged property is removed to
another state. A recent Arizona case holds that "chattel mortgages re-
corded in the state where executed and there conveying constructive no-
tice, continue to have the same effect when property is removed to an-
other state." Davis v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. (Ariz. 1929) 278 Pac.
384. This rule, arbitrarily laid down, would work grave injustice upon
any subsequent purchaser in the state to which the property has been re-
moved.
Many jurisdictions are in accord with the rule announced in the prin-
cipal case. Finance Corp. v. Kelly (Mo. 1921) 235 S. W. 146; In 'e Shan-
nahan & Wrightson Hardware Co. (1922) 2 W. W. Harr. (Del.) 37, 118
Atl. 599; National Bank v. Ripley (1927) 204 Iowa 590, 215 N. W. 647.
Contra are decisions in Pennsylvania, Texas, Michigan and Louisiana
which refuse to recognize chattel mortgages filed in another state. De-
want v. Decan (La. 1930) 128 So. 700; Sherman State Bank v. Carr (1900)
15 Pa. Super. 346; Farmer v. Evans (1921) 111 Tex. Civ. App. 283, 233
S. W. 101; Allison v. Teeters (1913) 176 Mich. 216, 142 N. W. 340. The
former rule would allow the mortgagors of property to remove it from
the state, even with the consent of the mortgagee, and in another state
defraud an innocent third party who would be subject to the original
mortgagee's priority. The latter would impose an undue burden on the
original mortgagee and would place his rights in jeopardy. A more just
rule is one which requires the consenting mortgagee or the mortgagee
with knowledge of the mortgagor's removal of the property to file his
lien in the state into which the property is taken. Moore v. Keystone
Driller Co. (1917) 30 Idaho 220, 163 Pac. 1114; Cable Piano Co. v. Lewis
(1922) 195 Ky. 666, 243 S. W. 924; Adamson v. Fogelstrom (1927) 221
Mo. App. 1243, 300 S. W. 841. Under this rule a mortgagee without knowl-
edge of the removal of the property maintains his priority without so
recording the mortgage. Cable Piano Co. v. Lewis, above; Walters v.
Skinner (C. C. A. 7, 1915) 272 F. 435. J. G. G., '32.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-REQUIREMENT OF BOND FOR MILK-
GATHERING STATIONS.-A statute required parties desiring to operate
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milk-gathering stations to procure licenses and provide bond to secure pay-
ment of debts contracted in the purchase of milk or cream from dairy-
men. Held, the statute is constitutional as a valid exercise of the police
power. People v. Perretta (1930) 253 N. Y. 305, 171 N. E. 72.
A similar statute was held unconstitutional in Connecticut as being
beyond the police power. State v. Porter (1920) 94 Conn. 639, 110 Atl.
59. A statute providing that the operator of the milk-gathering station
should be subject to a criminal fine for failure to pay the dairymen
promptly was held unconstitutional in Maine. State v. Lathan (1916)
115 Me. 176, 98 At. 578. The principal case assumes an advanced posi-
tion in holding that the legislature can, under the police power, require a
person entering a lawful business to furnish bond securing the payment
of his debts to parties from whom he purchases.
Statutes requiring banks to pay assessments into a fund in propor-
tion to their average daily deposits, thus guaranteeing repayment of de-
positors, have been held constitutional. Noble Bank v. Haskell (1911)
219 U. S. 104; Assaria State Bank v. Dolley (1911) 219 U. S. 121. So
of an ordinance requiring parties engaged in the general messenger busi-
ness to furnish bond conditioned upon the faithful delivery of packages,
letters, etc. Portland v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1915) 75 Ore. 37, 146
Pac. 148. So of a statute requiring the operators of cooperative butter
and cheese factories to give bond for the faithful accounting to dairymen
for milk and cream received. Hawthorn v. People (1883) 109 Ill. 302.
Statutes requiring commission men to furnish bond to secure payment
for goods they receive from farmers present nearly the same problem
as the statute in the instant case. Some courts have held them uncon-
stitutional. People ex rel. Valentine v. Berrien (1900) 124 Mich. 664,
83 N. W. 594; State v. Levitan (1926) 190 Wis. 646, 210 N. W. 111. A
large number of courts have held them constitutional. State ex rel.
Brewster v. Mohler (1916) 98 Kan. 465, 158 Pac. 408, aff'd (1918) 248
U. S. 112; State ex rel. Beck v. Wagener (1899) 77 Minn. 483, 80 N. W.
633; State v. Bowen & Co. (1915) 86 Wash. 23, 149 Pac. 330. A distinc-
tion may be drawn between the statute in the principal case, which se-
cures payment for sales made on credit, and the types of statutes men-
tioned above, .which involve quasi-fiduciary relations. But the reason be-
hind the various statutes is the same in all cases, namely, the protec-
tion of the public by regulation of businesses which, because of their nature
or the conditions surrounding them, can be or have been used as a medium
of fraud upon an appreciable portion of society. It is the same general
reason that underlies "blue sky" laws, licensing of peddlers, and other
such laws.
The two considerations involved in all of these statutes are the right
of a man to run his private business as he pleases, on the one side, and
the protection of society against irresponsible individuals or companies, on
the other. The courts which hold all of the above-mentioned statutes
unconstitutional and value the independent right to do business without
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restriction as a supreme right are in the minority. The modern tendency
is to safeguard the public against being defrauded. J. D. F., '32.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUMMARY ABATEMENT OF NUISANCES--CATTLE
DIPPING.-The statute in question provided for a compulsory dipping of
cattle infested with tick, to protect them from Texas fever, a contagious
disease. The dipping was to be done by a duly authorized inspector, the ex-
pense for which was to be paid by the owner. Appellee refused to comply
with the order of the officers, stating that she would do the dipping herself.
Held, the officers had a right to take the cattle, dip them, and hold them
until the expense of dipping was paid. Humphreys v. Tinsley (Ark.
1980) 25 S. W. 1.
The right to enact laws for the protection of domestic animals and to
prevent the spread of contagious diseases is recognized as a valid exer-
cise of the police power of the state. Railroad Co. v. Husen (1877) 95
U. S. 465; Grimes v. Eddy (1894) 126 Mo. 168, 28 S. W. 756. The reg-
ulation for the prevention of Texas fever is an exercise of that right.
Whitaker v. Parsons (1920) 80 Fla. 352, 86 So. 247.
The holding of cattle for the expense of dipping is not a taking of prop-
erty without due process of law. State v. Hall (1921) 26 Wyo. 260, 190
S. W. 436. It is within the power of the legislature to confer authority
upon officers to execute the law and adopt all needful regulations to that
end. State v. Hodges (1920) 180 N. C. 751, 105 S. E. 417. But the execu-
tion of such authority must conform to the requirements of the stat-
utes. D'Aquilla v. Anderson (1929) 153 Miss. 549, 120 So. 434.
Because an outbreak of Texas fever would be detrimental to the wel-
fare of the state, it does not appear that the power delegated in the in-
stant case was unreasonable. T. L., '32.
CONTRACTS--CONSIDERATION-PROMISE TO PERFORM PREVIOUS DuTY.-A
surety was relieved from liability on a note because an extension of time
was given by the payee of the note without the surety's consent. The
court, finding that the maker of the note had promised in return to pay
off the interest on a deed of trust which he was bound by his contract
with a third party to pay, held that this was valid consideration for the
extension on the note. Dickherber v. Trumball (Mo. App. 1930) 31 S. W.
(2d) 234.
It is well settled that for an extension of time to release the surety
it must be for a definite period of time, based upon a valuable considera-
tion, and must have been given without the surety's knowledge of con-
sent. Newkirk v. Hays (1925) 220 Mo. App. 514, 275 S. W. 964; People's
Bank of Chamois v. Smith (Mo. App. 1924) 263 S. S. 475; Citizen's Bank
of Union v. Hilkemeyer (Mo. App. 1929) 12 S. W. (2d) 516. The con-
sideration for such an extension must be a new consideration. Thornton
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